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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

BONNIE L. RANDALL, formerly BONNIE L. BRICKER,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 16230

DANNY E. BRICKER,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff-Respondent, hereinafter
referred to as Respondent, to renew a judgment that was entered
on February 26, 1970.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Both Respondent and Appellant moved for summary judgment and the lower court granted Respondent's motion and denied
the motion of Appellant, reasoning that Aee~llant's absenc~
from the State of Utah tolled the runnin<J of the statute ,pf
-·····--~
., ...

---·-
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limitations during his absence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the lower
court affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent was divorced from Appellant by decree
entered by the First Judicial District court of Box Elder
County, State of Utah, on the 11th day of June, 1968.
was awarded the care and custody of the two ( 2) minor

R~:

ch~.l~~.en

of the parties, and Appellant was ordered to pay to Respondent
One Dollar ($1.00) per year alimony and One Hundred Dollars
~----~~--~~-----~·
($100.00) per month child support.
(R. 33.)
On the 26th day of
~

.........

~

F~bJ:yar~-

...............

lll.P, judgment was

entered against Appellant and in favor of Respondent in the
amount of Two Thousand one Hundred Fifty Dollars ($2, 150. 00)
for arrearages in support payments and Seventy-Five Dollars
($75.00) for attorney's fees.

(R.8, 29.)

Nithin eight (8)

years prior to the commencement of this action, the attorney's
fees were paid but no other sums or amounts whatsoever were
paid on said judgment.

(R.8, 33.)

.

On the 30th day of June, 1978, this action was com~

-

-------·--

menced for the purpose of renewing said judgment.

(R.2.)
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µ~--

Between the date of entry of said judgment and the date
this action was commenced, Appellant resided in the State
'£

of North Carolina for a period in excess of
(R.9, 20,

9~e

_C.ll

year.

27.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S ABSENCE FROM THE STATE
OF UTAH TOLLED THE RUNNING OF THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Neither the fact that approximately eight years and

four months elapsed between the entry of the February 26, 1970,
judgment and the commencement of this action nor the fact
that Appellant was absent from the State of Utah for more
than twelve months during said period of time is in dispute.

The issue to be resolved is whether Appellant's absence
from the State of Utah tolled the running of the statute of
limitations.
Section 78-12-22, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
with respect to a suit on a judgment:
Within eight years: An action upon a judgment
or decree of any court of the United States,
or any state or territory within the United
States . . . . An action to enforce any liability due or to become due, for failure to
provide support or maintenance for dependent
children.

-

3 -
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However, Section 78-12-35 provides:
If when a cause of action accrues against
a person when he is out of the state, the
action may be conunenced within the term
herein limited after his return to the
state; and if after a cause of action
accrues he departs from the state, the
time of his absence is not part of the time
limited for the conunencement of the action.
(Emphasis added)
It is evident from reading the foregoing sections
that the legislature did not intend that a Plaintiff be deprived
of his or her cause of action because a potential defendant
would absent himself from the State.

That policy was first

o.

judicially enunciated in the State of Utah in Keith
Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 Pac. 954 (1917).

Brien

In that case,

the defendant had absented himself from the State for five and
one-half years after the cause of action accrued.

Notwith-

standing the fact that defendant's family had remained in
the State of Utah during that period of time and, therefore,
process could have been served upon them, the court said at
page 956:
Indeed, the authorities that hold that absence
from the State tolls the Statute all agree
that the statute runs only during the time the
debtor is openly in the State, and immediately
on his leaving it, the statute again ceases to
run until his return, and that in computing
time, all the period of absence must be considered and added together.
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o.

This Court reaffirmed the Keith

Brien doctrine

in the case of Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 Utah 391,
231 Pac. 123 (1924).

prior judgment.

There, plaintiff sued defendant on a

During the running of the Statute of

Limitations, the defendant personally had been absent from
the State but had maintained a home within the State.

This

Court held that his absence from the State was sufficient
to toll the statute.
Respondent relies ~-:.rily _<;>.~.-~~~.~~~~Snyder
---~----···\...·•'-"'·-

......

v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915,

(1964).

The facts

of that case are clearly distinguishable from the case at
~---~--

bar.

In that case, plaintiff was

in~1:!:._~d

in an automobile

~------

accident by a negligent defendant who left the State of Utah,
returning to his home in California, after the accident.
After the Statute
of Limitations
had run, plaintiff ...brought
- - ...
.... ,_. __
---~--•.--.:.-

..,-,.,..~r::.....-ar,.,,.,_~.._.._

~,

suit in Utah claiming that the statute had been
, , ...,

_,,.,,,,_C,o•~ ..... ~.:>.l~ ..... f'-" 0''""''-~~ ....~~l...i.~~

defendant's absence from the State.

~,.~

~olled

by

gr

This Court held that

defendant's absence did not toll the running of the statute,
and thus, the action was barred.

However, the basis of that

decision
...______ ' was the fact
.. that even though the defendant was
-----

absent from the State, he was subject to service of process
by virtue of Section 41-12-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

in that he had appointed the se:7.~_1:~~X~ ~:-.s~~te_~:,_12_~~-~~:~t
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for that purpose.

Citing those facts and the applicable

statute, this Court stated at page 916:
The defendants thus had an agent within
the State upon whom process could have
been served for them, and they were not
"absent" from the State in the sense
contemplated by the statute, that is,
unavailable for the service of process.
Therefore, the plaintiff was not prevented from commencin her action at
any time she desired.
Emphasis added)
In the instant case, the Appellant appointed no
agent for service of process, nor was his family within the
State, nor was Appellant amenable to process on the judgment.
In each case cited by Appellant in his brief, the defendant
remained subject to the jurisdiction of the court either
by means of an agent within the state upon whom process
could be served, or the state's long-arm statue.

In the

instant case, neither means was at Respondent's disposal to
effectuate service on Appellant.

Thus, the cases cited by

Defendant are inapplicable to the case at bar and are not
controlling.
POINT II
WITH RESPECT TO ACTION ON THE 1970
JUDGMENT, APPELLANT WAS NOT SUBJECT
TO THE JURISDICTION OF UTAH'S COURTS
DURING THE TIME HE WAS ABSENT FROM
THE STATE.
Annotatei
Appellant relies on Section 30-2- 5 , Utah Code
1953, as amended, which provides in relevant part:
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. . . The court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new
orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support and maintenance,
or the distribution of the property as shall
be reasonable and necessary . . . .
He contends that since the

court~ich

granted

~~~e

maintained continuing jurisdiction with respect to support
-~ .. -~·,,-" -- .- ' -- "•
and maintenance, the action on the 1970 jud<a;ment coy~ve
been commenced and process served on Appellant while he was
_ _ _ _ ,_..........._.,.,.,........-""'- .,....:J<,..,,,

.,.,-

_,,., __ .....,,,.,_,_

.. ''"

·-·,-,·>(;..-'~><>~·'·'

~-,.

• .---...,....._ _ _ _.....,_ __

absent from the State and, thus, there was no
.... -·. 1'.:• - ........

,J.1'(.it"'~--.. ~·"~

rea~r

., ,.,._,.._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ •..-..

the running of the statute of limitations to be tolled.
However, Appellant ignores the fact that once a judgment
for arrearages in support payments is entered, the support
obligation merges into the judgment which becomes like any
other judgment and the nature of 'the indebtedness is lost.
In Yergensen v. Ford, 16 Utah 2d 397, 402 P.2d
696, the plaintiff sued to renew a judgment which had been

rendered more than eight years before the commencement of
the action.

The judgment had been rendered in an action on

three promissory notes.

After the entry of the judgment, the

judgment debtors, in order to secure a lien release, entered
into a written agreement acknowledging the obligation and
thereafter made payments totaling $450.00.

The last payment

was made within eight years before the commencement of the

ec.
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action on the judgment.

Plaintiff argued that since there had

been part payment the statute of limitations had been tolled
to the date of the last payment.

The court rejected that

argument noting that the running of the statute would be
tolled by part payment only in cases founded on contract.
This Court in affirming the judgment of the lower court
stated at page 697 of its opinion:
It is next argued by plaintiff that the
phrase, "In any case founded on contract,"
contained in 78-12-44 includes the judgment in the instant action because it was
founded upon the promissory notes.
In
effect, the plaintiff claims that the debt
(contract) upon which his judgment was
rendered is revived so that it retains its
original character and thus falls within the
tolling provisions of 78-12-44.
This argument is without merit, for when a
valid and final 'ud ent for the pa ment of
money is rendered, the origina claim is
extinguished, and a new cause of action on
the judgment is substituted for it.
In
such case, the original claim loses its
character and identity and is mer ed in the
judgment.
Emphasis added)
In Beesley v. Badger, 66 Utah 194, 240 Pac. 458 (19251
this court stated at page 460:
By the weight of authority, and as we think
the better reason, although there are cases
to the contrary, a decree for alimony in a
gross sum as well as to past due and unpaid
installments stands upon the same footing as
ordinary monei judgments and may be en~orced
by execution in the same manner as ordinary
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money judgments may be enforced.
(Emphasis added)
Since a judgment for support money stands on the same
footing as an ordinary judgment, like any other judgment,
there are only two legal proceedings to enforce it:

(1) a

suit on the judgment; or (2) some form of proceeding in execution for collection.

(Yergensen, supra.)

The nature of

the original claim for arrearages in support payments having
been lost by being merged into the judgment, the domestic
court lost its continuing jurisdiction over the claim, but
retained jurisdiction with respect to support and maintenance
obligations accruing after entry of the judgment.
Appellant next argues that he remained subject to
the courts continuing jurisdiction under Utah's long-arm
statute.

Section 78-27-24 Utah Gode Annotated, 1953,

provides in relevant part:
Any person . . . whether or not a citizen
or resident of this State who . . . does
any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state as to any claim arising
from:

* * *
(6) with respect to actions of divorce and
separate maintenance, the maintenance in
this state of a martimonial domicile at the
time the claim arose or the commission in
this state of the act giving rise to the
claim.
(Emphasis added)
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This is neither an action for divorce nor separate maintenance,
but is an action on a judgment.

The claim for support monies

arising out of the decree of divorce merged into the judgment
and the original nature of the claim was lost.
and Beesley, supra.)

(Yergensen

The long-arm statute was, therefore,

inapplicable to this action.

This view is supported by

Section 78-27-26, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which
provides:
Only claims arising from acts enumerated herein
may be asserted against a defendant in an action
in which jurisdiction over him is based upon
this act.
(long-arm statute.)
Since there is no provision in said act for an action to renew
a judgment, the Utah courts could not have exercised personal
jurisdiction over the Appellant, in this action, while he was
absent from the State.
Appellant argues that once the courts of this State
obtain jurisdiction, they continue to maintain that jurisdictio:,
However, in Gass v. Hunting, 561 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1977), the
plaintiff filed an action to renew an old judgment.

The

judgment debtor had left the State of Utah after the rendition
of the judgment.

This issue in that case was:

"Is the Statute

of Limitations tolled while the judgment debtors are not within
this State?"

This Court answered that question affirmatively
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-holding that

11

A suit

on a judgment may be commenced during the

eight-year period following the entry thereof, and an absence
from the State tolls the eight-year period. 11

(Gass at 1072;

emphasis added)
While not addressing the issue directly in that
case, this Court recognized the legal principle that once
a judgment has been entered, the court no longer has jurisdiction based on the original claim.

Otherwise, the court

could have asserted that jurisdiction in the subsequent
action and there would have been no need to toll the running
of the Statute of Limitations.
Additionally, while no Utah case has interpreted
Utah's long-arm statute cited above, the subject was treated
in the Utah Law Review, Vol. 1970, April, No. 2 at page 242
as follows:
Thus, an abandoned wife may obtain personal
jurisdiction over her deserting spouse and
sue in Utah for separate maintenance or
alimony incidental to a divorce action.
Inconvenience still remains, however, in
that she ma have to sue on her Utah 'ud ment in a foreign forum.
Emphasis added)
Finally, Appellant argues that each of the support
installments became a final judgment as soon as it became due.
While i t may be true that it is final in the sense that it
could not thereafter be modified, it is not final in the sense
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that execution will issue on the unpaid amounts.

For

exe~

cution to issue, the amount of the arrearages must be determined and a judgment entered for that amount.

Then, and

only then, is it a final judgment for all purposes.

And

c<

t<

it is from that date that the Statute of Limitations begins

p

to run.

L

CONCLUSION
With respect to the 1970 judgment, Appellant was
not subject to the jurisdiction of Utah's Courts while he was
absent from the State.

His absence, therefore, tolled the

running of the statute of limitations.

That being the case,

the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this lJi:ti.day of June, 1979.

~_gdJL
ObertF.Orton

David S. Walsh
MARSDEN, ORTON & LILJENQUIST
Attorneys for Respondent
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to L. Rich Humpherys, Esq., CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN, KENNEDY &
POWELL, attorneys for Appellant, 900 Kearns Building, Salt
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